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The Panama Canal Treaties of 1977: Extracts from a
Communique Dated April 25, 1978 from the
Panamanian Foreign Ministry, on the United States
Reservations to the Treaties
I. Introduction
When the Senate of the United States gave its advice and consent to Presi-
dent Carter regarding the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and
Operation of the Panama Canal, the Foreign Ministry issued two communi-
ques (16 and 27 March) in which it said that the government would not express
its judgment on the amendments, understandings, conditions and reservations
approved by the Senate until the same body also arrived at its constitutional
decision regarding Panama Canal treaty.
On the 18th of this month the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to
President Carter regarding the Panama Canal treaty which will be analyzed in
this communique.
With the completion of the Senate's proceedings in the United States, the
Foreign Ministry, complying with orders from His Excellency President
Demetrio B. Lakas and His Excellency Chief of Government Brig. Gen. Omar
Torrijos Herrera, now undertakes to fulfill its duty of explaining to the
citizenry the juridical scope of the resolutions of the Senate and setting forth
its stand concerning the Senate's decision.
II. The DeConcini Reservation and the
Principle of Nonintervention
The struggle against colonialism has been long and bloody. The best exam-
ple of a collective effort to break the chain of oppression was given by America
when Bolivar liberated the people and gave them the fruits of their own
government. Despite this independence, however, new forces alien to our peo-
ple established spheres of influence and colonial situations which, fortunately,
have been almost eliminated. In addition to their fight for their emancipation,
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the peoples of America have also struggled to eradicate all forms of in-
terference in their domestic affairs.
A clear Latin American contribution to the development of international
law has been the formalization of the principle of nonintervention, which was
codified for the first time in Article 8 of the conference [as published] on the
rights and duties of states approved by the Seventh Pan-American Conference
held in Montevideo in 1933. This rule states:
No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's position was clearly expressed by the
U.S. delegate in these words:
Declaration made by the U.S. commission upon signing the Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States in Montevideo in 1933:
Any observing person must clearly understand now that under the Roosevelt ad-
ministration the U.S. Government is as opposed as any other government to inter-
ference with the liberty, sovereignty or other domestic affairs or processes of the
governments of other nations....
I feel safe in committing myself to the statement that, with our support for the
general principle of nonintervention as it has been defined, no government should
fear any intervention by the United States under the Roosevelt administration.
This principle or basic norm of international conduct was successfully intro-
duced by Latin American jurists, including our Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro, into the
UN Charter, adopted in 1945, which in Article 2 (4) states:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
In April 1948, 30 years ago, the American countries met in Bogotd where
they clearly and categorically reiterated their support for the principle of non-
intervention as follows:
Article 15 of the OAS Charter approved in Bogott in 1948: "No state or
group of states has the right to intervene, -directly or indirectly, regardless of
the reason, in the domestic or foreign affairs of another. The foregoing prin-
ciple prohibits not only action by the armed forces, but any other form of in-
terference or attack on the character of the state and political, cultural and
economic elements which constitute it." (Note: This article is identical to Arti-
cle 18 of the OAS Charter amended by the Buenos Aires protocol in 1967.)
The aforementioned article is included in Chapter 17 of the OAS Charter
which is entitled "Rights and Fundamental Duties of States," and Article 11
of this same charter states:
The fundamental duties of the states are not susceptible to impairment in any
manner.
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The foregoing signifies that the states have accepted a limitation to their
capacity to contract internationally. The state cannot contract the destruction
of its character, and there is no pact whatsoever which validly achieves that
objective.
In view of the stipulation of the aforementioned Article 11, during the ple-
biscite period the Foreign Ministry spokesmen explained that Article V of the
canal treaty, which establishes the principle of nonintervention as a duty of the
United States to abstain from meddling in the domestic affairs of Panama,
was unnecessary from the legal viewpoint, but that it had been included as a
precautionary political measure. And in view of multilateral rules contained in
treaties-laws, as are the UN and OAS Charters, conventions which regulate the
conduct of Panama, the United States and other countries, there is not the
slightest shadow of a doubt that no state, superpower or ministrate, can claim
the "right" to intervene in areas which are of the exclusive competence of
other states.
But a hardly edifying spectacle was given when some U.S. senators, during
the Senate debate on the Torrijos-Carter treaty, rudely used language which
without a doubt indicated that, in their opinion, the United States has the
"right to intervene" in Panama to preserve the neutrality and security of the
canal.
This must be made very clear. The "right of intervention" does not exist;
everything is to the contrary [todo lo contrariol. Intervention has been pro-
scribed in international legal life. There may be interventions. These cannot be
avoided, just as crime cannot be avoided, but such interventions can only be
regressively engendered by colonialist and neocolonialist minds which still do
not understand that the destiny of man is freedom.
During his speech in the Senate, Senator DeConcini used language which of-
fended the dignity of the Panamanian nation and which is not consonant with
the great advancements of humanity. He spoke of so-called rights of interven-
tion which the peoples of the world, organized under the symbol of the United
Nations, extinguished once and for all in a collective manner. However,
Senator DeConcini also stated:
This does not mean, nor should it be interpreted as, a right of the United States to in-
terfere in the domestic affairs of Panama.
Any intervention violates the basic rule of self-determination.
Any intervention violates the respect which every state owes to the indepen-
dence, territorial sovereignty and honor of other states. Therefore, our citizens
expressed with righteous firmness their repudiation of Senator DeConcini's
words used in explaining his amendment.
Fully identified with the national will, the Panamanian Government made
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timely efforts before the U.S. Government to insure the Senate would reaffirm
the international commitments of the United States contained in the UN and
OAS charters. We were successful in that respect. To dispell any doubt, the
U.S. Senate in its 18 April resolution stated:
Pursuant to its adherence to the principle of nonintervention, any action taken by
the United States of America in the exercise of its rights to assure that the Panama
Canal shall remain open, neutral, secure and accessible pursuant to the provisions of
the treaty and the neutrality treaty, and the resolutions of advice and consent thereto,
shall be only for the purpose of assuring that the canal shall remain open, neutral,
secure and accessible, and shall not have as its purpose nor be interpreted as a right of
intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Panama or interference with its
political or sovereign integrity.
This Senate resolution renders indefensible the allegation that the Torrijos-
Carter treaties grant the United States any right of intervention in Panama.
According to international law, the obligation which all states have of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of others is but the corollary of the prin-
ciples of sovereign equality of states and respect for their political indepen-
dence. If sovereignty is the right of all peoples to have their own government,
to not have any other supreme state power, it is evident that any intervention
conflicts with political independence and is repudiated legally by all humanity.
Panama's political independence, territorial integrity and self-determination
are guaranteed by the unshakable will of the Panamanian people and the ac-
tive solidarity of peoples of the world, in accordance with what was solemnly
compacted in the UN Charter. On 28 November 1821 Panama declared its will
to be free and independent. This decision was reaffirmed on 3 November 1903
and also on 9 January 1964 when the January Martyrs who offered their lives
pointed out the path of sacrifices as the price of liberation from the colonialist
yoke. Therefore, the Republic of Panama rejects, in a united and decisive
fashion, any attempt by any country to intervene in its internal affairs. This is
not only a matter of international law but of the steadfast will of our people.
Liberty is an inborn right of human beings and people. One is free when
liberty takes hold of the soul of a people. That torch exists firmly in the heart
of each and every Panamanian, and therefore any attempt to intervene in mat-
ters of the exclusive competence of Panamanians will be rejected without any
hesitation.
III. Intervention is Repudiated in the U.S. Senate
The voices of great U.S. leaders were heard clearly as they repudiated any
interpretation that an alleged "right" to intervene in Panama could be in-
ferred. Senators Frank Church, Mike Gravel, George McGovern, Jacob
Javits, Paul Sarbanes, Edward Kennedy and others stated that the era of inter-
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vention is a thing of the past. It is relevant to quote a portion of Senator Ken-
nedy's statements:
And it is quite fair that the government and people of Panama should aspire to end
the foreign military occupation of their own territory, that they should aspire to
recover full national control of all their territory almost 100 years after becoming in-
dependent.
For his part, Senator Church said:
The UN Charter, the OAS Charter and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance-our military alliances with our neighbors in this hemisphere-all contain
provisions which prohibit intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. There-
fore, the interventionist policy of the United States is a thing of the past.
However, in Latin America memories have not faded. The main unifying force in
the foreign policy of the Latin American nations over the last 40 years has been sup-
port for the principle of nonintervention. Having committed themselves 40 years ago
to a new and more mature relationship with the United States, the Latin American
countries are determined to keep it that away.
IV. General Torrijos Set the Parameters of Dignity in
Order to Make a Decision
Despite the fact that the Foreign Ministry communiques expressed the gov-
ernment's decision to withhold judgment regarding the reservations intro-
duced into the Canal Neutrality Treaty, it is obvious that General Torrijos'
statements to the press and his notes of the chiefs of state of the whole world
and to President Carter indicated the government's dissatisfaction and con-
cern regarding the interventionist nature of the so-called DeConcini reserva-
tion. Therefore, in his note to the chiefs of state, General Torrijos said:
Because of the support which your people and government have given to the Pana-
manian cause and because, according to Article 7 of the neutrality treaty, Panama
and the United States will open to the support of all the states of the world the objec-
tives of this treaty, we have believed that is our duty to inform you of this situation
about which we have publicly expressed our deep concern.
And in his letter to President Carter, our chief of government said:
However, I do wish to point out that this study will be based on the following con-
cepts: Panama will consider unacceptable any reservation which offends the national
dignity, which distorts or changes the objectives of the treaty or which is designed to
prevent the effective exercise by Panama of sovereignty over all its territory, the turn-
over of the canal and the military withdrawal on 31 December 1999.
V. Analysis of the Amendments, Reservations
and Understandings
The Foreign Ministry now proceeds, methodically, to analyze the amend-
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ments, reservations and understandings by which the U.S. Senate gave its ad-
vice and consent to the Torrijos-Carter treaties.
I. Amendments
A. At the end of Article IV, insert the following: "A correct and authorized
statement of certain rights and duties of the parties under the foregoing is con-
tained in the statement of understanding issued by the Government of the
United States of America on 14 October 1977 and by the Government of the
Republic of Panama on 18 October 1977, which is hereby incorporated as an
integral part of this treaty, as follows:
Under the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Pan-
ama Canal (the neutrality treaty), Panama and the United States have the respon-
sibility to assure that the canal will remain open and secure to ships of all nations.
The correct interpretation of this principle is that each of the two countries shall, in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes, defend the canal against
any threat to the regime of neutrality, and consequently shall have the right to act
against' any aggression or threat directed against the canal or against the peaceful
transit of vessels through the canal. This does not mean, nor shall it be interpreted as,
a right of intervention of the United States in the internal afairs of Panama. Any
United States action will be directed at insuring that the canal will remain open,
secure and accessible, and it shall never be directed against the territorial integrity or
political independence of Panama.
B. At the end of the first paragraph of Article VI, insert the following:
In accordance with the statement of understanding mentioned in Article IV above:
The neutrality treaty provides that the vessels of war and auxiliary vessels of the
United States and Panama will be entitled to transmit the canal expeditiously. This is
intended, and it shall be so interpreted, to assure the transit of such vessels through
the canal as quickly as possible, without any impediment, with expedited treatment,
and in case of need or emergency, to go to the head of the line of vessels in order to
transit the canal rapidly.
A perusal of these two amendments reveals that they correspond exactly
with the statement of understanding agreed upon by General Torrijos and
President Carter on 14 October 1977. This declaration contains an authentic
interpretation of the treaty of neutrality agreed upon by the signatories. It was
released in Panama before the plebiscite and accepted by the citizenry in ap-
proving the Torrijos-Carter treaties.
What the above transcribed amendments do is to formalize the statement of
understanding because it was not signed. But this fact does not minimize its
obligatory power. In international law commitments are also contracted in
oral form. The interpretation of the neutrality treaty agreed upon by General
Torrijos and President Carter obligates Panama as well as the United States
and is part of the treaties even though the document is not signed. It was there
that the authentic interpretation of the neutrality treaty was given by the per-
son who in Panama has the constitutional responsibility for directing foreign
relations.
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II. Reservations:
A. Subject to the condition which will be included in the instrument of
ratification of the treaty which will be exchanged with the Republic of Pan-
ama, notwithstanding the provisions of Article V or any other provisions of
the treaty, if the canal is closed, or its operations are interfered with, the
Republic of Panama and the United States of America shall each independent-
ly have the right to take such steps as it deems necessary, in accordance with its
constitutional processes, including the use of military force in Panama, to
reopen the canal or restore the operations of the canal, as the case may be.
This is what has commonly been called the DeConcini reservation. Obvious-
ly its scope departed from the Torrijos-Carter declaration because it elim-
inated the obligation of the United States not to intervene in the internal af-
fairs of Panama and to respect the political independence and territorial in-
tegrity of Panama.
Panama has recognized the U.S. right to act unilaterally in defense of the
neutrality of the canal. General Torrijos reaffirmed this to President Carter in
the note he sent him on 15 March 1978:
Subsequently, and by virtue of the confusion created regarding the two articles of the
neutrality treaty we proceeded to issue a memorandum of understanding which clear-
ly interpreted the unilateral capacity of each of our countries to preserve the regime
of neutrality against threats, attack or closure of the canal, the priority passage of
warships in case of emergency and noninterference in the internal affairs of Panama
as well as the inviolability of territorial integrity and political independence of my
country.
As abominable as the DeConcini reservation were the baseless explanations
of the same senator, who seeks to revive U.S. intervention in the internal af-
fairs of Panama. Fortunately, the Senate approved the 18 April resolution,
known as the Church amendment, which reaffirms respect for the principle of
nonintervention in the internal affairs of the countries of America, which was
reproduced above.
With this last Senate resolution, it is evident that the United States has reaf-
firmed its international commitments in light of the UN and OAS Charters.
With it the DeConcini reservation has been rid of its imperialistic and interven-
tionist claws, and the enforcement of the principle of nonintervention has been
reestablished. The specter of new interventions at the end of the 20th century,
which rightly caused concern to all Panamanians, has been eliminated.
B. The agreement "to maintain the regime of neutrality established in this
treaty" in Article IV of the treaty means that either of the two parties to the
treaty may, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, take unilateral
action to defend the Panama Canal against any threat, as determined by the
party taking such action.
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C. The determination of "need or emergency" for the purpose of any ves-
sels of war or auxiliary vessel of the United States or Panama going to the head
of the line of vessels in order to transit the Panama Canal rapidly shall be
made by the nation operating such vessel.
These agreements are consistent with the Torrijos-Carter statement of 14
October 1977.
*i **
Reservations and Understandings Introduced by the
U.S. Senate into the Panama Canal Treaty
A. Reservations. 1. Pursuant to its adherence to the principle of noninter-
vention, any action taken by the United States of America in the exercise of its
rights to assure that the Panama Canal shall remain open, neutral, secure and
accessible, pursuant to the provisions of this treaty and the neutrality treaty
and the resolutions of advice and consent thereto, shall be only for the purpose
of assuring that the canal shall remain open, neutral, secure and accessible,
and shall not have as its purpose nor be interpreted as a right of intervention in
the internal affairs of the Republic of Panama or interference with its political
independence or sovereign integrity.
This reservation is extremely important politically. With it the Senate dis-
sipated the fears which had emerged throughout Latin America that the De-
Concini amendment had revived "gunboat" and "big stick" diplomacy in this
hemisphere. The Senate has reaffirmed the U.S. commitment in multilateral
pacts that are treaties-laws regulating not only life on the American continent
but throughout the world. Intervention is not a right; it is an international
crime.
By virtue of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Treaty the big powers renounced the
use of force as a means to settle conflicts. Based on this pact, the United
States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France took the Nazi war
criminals to the scaffold.
The people of the world consecrated their rejection of the use of force in Ar-
ticle 2.3 of the UN Charter; the peoples of America did likewise in Article 20
of the OAS Charter. Additionally, Article 2.4 of the UN Charter and Article
18 of the OAS Charter consecrate the respect for the sovereign decisions of
each state in matters which, as stipulated by international law, are of their sole
domestic purview. These are norms that perfect the principle of noninterven-
tion in the legal sense.
Panama experienced moments of patriotic indignation following the intro-
duction of the so-called DeConcini reservation. Via diplomatic channels the
national government firmly expressed its rejection of that amendment as
something harmful not only to U.S. relations with Panama but its relations
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with the entire continent. President Carter and the Senate leaders quickly
understood this. The Senate then pointed out that a major tenet of U.S. policy
is its adherence to the principle of nonintervention. And this adherence also
pertains to the neutrality treaty which is of an indefinite duration. It is neces-
sary to stress that the Senate's definition of U.S. policy in this reservation
covers both treaties, which are mentioned specifically in the reservation, so
that there would not be the slightest doubt that the DeConcini amendment
added to the neutrality treaty would not continue in force. [Es necesario
remarcar que la expresion de politica que hace el Senado en esta reserva in-
cluye a ambos tratados, los cuales se mencionan especificamente en esta reser-
va, para no haya la menor sospecha de que la enmienda DeConcini anadida al
tratado de neutralidad sigue viva.] What continues in force are the legal com-
mitments of the United States to the UN and OAS Charters that forbid in-
tervention.
And further, as the instruments drawn up by one or more parties regarding a
treaty (Article 31 of the Vienna convention on treaty laws) are very important
for the interpretation of treaties in international law, it is deemed pertinent to
transcribe the letter that President Carter sent General Torrijos on 18 April:
GEN. OMAR TORRIJOS HERRERA
Chief of Government of Panama
DEAR GENERAL TORRIJOS: A few moments ago the U.S. Senate granted its
consent to the second of the Panama Canal treaties that you and I signed in
Washington in September of last year.
The ratification [sic] of the new treaties opens a new era in U.S. relations not
only with Panama but with all the nations of the hemisphere. Working jointly
our two nations can set an example and encourage others in the Americas and
elsewhere to work toward just and constructive international cooperation in
the pursuit of common goals.
With its actions today the Senate has reaffirmed what was important in the
treaties from the beginning: that the United States, while safeguarding its in-
terest in a secure, open and accessible canal, does not intend to interfere in the
domestic affairs of Panama, its government, its policies or its cultural integri-
ty, nor in any way undermine its sovereignty or its political independence.
These are the principles that we have always cherished as a nation. We have
lived up to them in our relations with other American republics since President
Roosevelt proclaimed his adherence to the principle of nonintervention in
1933. Those principles are consecrated as international rights in the UN and
OAS Charters. Therefore, it is appropriate that those principles, particularly
the principle that no nation has the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of
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another, should be incorporated into the treaties and its related documents, in-
cluding the Senate resolutions. When we meet to exchange the ratification
documents we will be able to reiterate that this principle of nonintervention is
clearly accepted by our two countries.
Sincerely,
JIMMY CARTER
In this letter, President Carter reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to refrain
from intervention in Panama's internal affairs.
The instruments of ratification to be exchanged by the United States and the
Republic of Panama shall each include provisions whereby each party agrees
to waive its rights and release the other party from its obligations under
Paragraph 2 of Article XII.
Article XII of the Panama Canal treaty refers to the possibility of building a
sea-level canal in Panama or adding a third set of locks to the present canal.
There is no question that the subject of a sea-level canal was not introduced
into the negotiation at Panama's initiative. This subject was given great impor-
tance during the stage of the negotiation which led to the draft treaties of 1967.
In the negotiations that began in 1971, the subject remained latent for several
years and then it suddenly regained prominence in July 1977. The United
States made proposals which Panama vigorously rejected. The United States
wanted an option in perpetuity to build a sea-level canal in Panama. This was
the main issue discussed at the meeting in Bogotd of the presidents of Colom-
bia, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Mexico, the prime minister of Jamaica and the
chief of government of Panama. It was there that a formula, basically the one
established in Paragraphs I and 2 of Article XII, was developed.
According to Paragraph 1 of Article XII, for the duration of the treaty,
Panama and the United States ". . . commit themselves to study jointly the
feasibility . . ." of a sea-level canal in Panama. If after this study the two
parties agree that this canal is necessary, they may negotiate the terms of a new
treaty for its construction. Therefore, there is no obligation here restricting
Panama or placing an obligation on its territory.
Paragraph 2 A. Article XII represents a great concession made by Panama
to the United States, Panama pledged not to build a canal or to permit a canal
to be built in Panama for the duration of the treaty, that is until the year 2000,
without the consent of the United States. Here there is a clear obligation on the
territory of Panama which the United States cannot negotiate for 22 years.
Paragraph 2 B. of Article XII places a limitation on the United States in its
negotiating capacity. According to this article, the United States cannot nego-
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tiate for 22 years with third countries of America on the construction of a
canal outside Panama, unless Panama frees it from that limitation.
Paragraphs A. and B. referred to the establishment of a legal equilibrium in
the counter-claims [contraprestaciones] of the parties. But in the material as-
pect, it is obvious that Paragraph 2 is balanced against Panama because it is
known that the most adequate routes for building a sea-level canal are in Pan-
ama. The disproportion of the distance in the routes of Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
and Colombia compared to Panama is immense. And it is not only the prob-
lem of construction costs but also the length of the routes which delays the
transit of ships, which practically excludes the possibility of building a new
canal outside Panama. The Senate considered that it was too much for a na-
tion as small as Panama to have a veto over its negotiating capacity. It attribu-
ted more value to this than to the concessiontwhich Panama accepted in
Bogotd for the sake of reaching an agreement [transaccion].
Now Panama can, if it so desires and finds adequate financing, build a new
canal whenever it deems it appropriate without having to consult the United
States. At the same time, the United States is free to negotiate with third coun-
tries without Panama's veto.
The formula contained in the reservation, previously agreed upon with Pan-
ama, does not alter the treaty. What the two parties will do is that, upon ex-
changing the ratification instruments, each will waive its right and release one
another. The treaty is not modified. If there is a waiving and mutual release of
the reciprocal duties and rights agreed to in Paragraph 2, it is because this
clause remained unchanged. But the presidents of the two countries will ex-
pressly waive the right given their countries by the treaty and will release each
other from their obligations regarding the sea-level canal.
By order of Article 277 of the constitution, General Torrijos has the power
to direct Panama's foreign relations. In the exercise of this power, he will
waive any right which does not have practical significance and will accept the
U.S. waiver which is of practical significance to Panama. Now we will have the
free disposition of the territory which God placed in the hands of Panama-
nians and which for well-known historical reasons has been in foreign lands.
The monopoly of routes granted to the United States is eliminated forever. An
appropriate formula was found so as to avoid commitments with the United
States regarding the sea-level canal in Panama.
Other fundamental achievements of the negotiations are the abrogation of
the 1903 treaty and its amendments (Article I) and the resumption by Panama
of its exclusive jurisdiction throughout all national territory (Article XI). The
amendments contained in the Senate resolutions have not tarnished these
definitive achievements of our people.
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Nothing will prevent Panama from effective exercise of its sovereignty
throughout all its territory. The position of the U.S. Government during the
Senate debates was that the United States has no sovereignty in the Canal
Zone. Carter has spoken firmly in defense of Panama's traditional thesis. This
position has cleared this legal problem in the minds of the American people. In
keeping with this position, Article XI establishes that Panama will resume
total jurisdiction in the Canal Zone when the treaty enters into force. U.S.
jurisdictional rights, the only thing it possessed in Panama, will end on that
date. The Senate debate and the firm position of the Senate majority have
reaffirmed Panamanian sovereignty, which will be exercised effectively by
Panama when the treaty goes into effect, because this treaty eliminates the so-
called Canal Zone government. The anachronism of two governments in a
single territory, as was stressed with patriotic zeal by President Demetrio
Basilio Lakas in a meeting with President Nixon in 1971, has been brought to
an end.
Great national objectives have been achieved. By virtue of the generational
alpinism spoken of very properly so by the chief of government, all genera-
tions of Isthmians have contributed their ideas, efforts and sacrifices. Each
Panamanian has been a volunteer soldier in the common task of liberation.
Beginning with the note by Jose Domingo de Obaloia and Eusebio A. Morales
in 1904, which best expresses our legal arguments, up to the tragic event of the
January Martyrs-22 Panamanian heroes offered their lives and gave an
everlasting cry of Panama's wish to be sovereign and free-it can be said that
Panama has sought to:
A. Abrogate the 1903 treaty;
B. Recover the patrimony constituted by Panama's geographic position and
its Isthmian configuration to exploit the most important natural resource given
to it by God-that is, to exploit to its maximum transit operations of the canal,
the railroad and ports under its exclusive control and administration;
C. Reincorporate the Canal Zone into the rest of the fatherland's territory;
D. End the U.S. civilian and military presence;
E. Place the canal under a system which will guarantee the transit of ships of
all flags on equal conditions and isolate the canal from any public controversy;
and
F. Train qualified personnel in technical matters to assume responsibility
for the canal's administration to the fullest extent possible.
The Foreign Ministry can state with satisfaction that the fundamental objec-
tives which were imbedded in the national soul have basically been achieved.
Unfortunately, all of these objectives will not be achieved immediately. It in-
volves a liberation program that will be completed in 22 years, because the
treaty is the product of negotiations in which reciprocal concessions were
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made. All Panamanians would like this term to be shorter, but we were able to
achieve only that which is established in the treaties, despite the titanic and
persistent efforts of our negotiator.
The national government has reached the conclusion that the treaties un-
questionably achieve, within a reasonable period of time, the fundamental ob-
jectives of the Panamanian nation. Because of this, the national government
will consent to the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Torrijos-
Carter treaties. With the entry into force of the treaties, better instruments of
struggle will be placed in the hands of the republic. With them, Panama will
continue its efforts so that the national objectives will be realized in a shorter
period of time by virtue of opportune and patriotic negotiations that the
governments of the future will undertake.
The Foreign Ministry has faith in the capacity for struggle of the Panama-
nian. It also has faith that with time the U.S. public will better understand
Panama's reasons for insisting on an improvement in the terms of its contrac-
tual relationship with the United States. This will facilitate the future decisions
of the U.S. Government in its relations with Panama. The North American
people are a just people. Some of their leaders have shown courage, patriotism
and a clear sense of history. The Torrijos-Carter treaties are evident achieve-
ments in our liberation struggle, but they are not the final phase.
Upon agreeing to the terms of the protocol of the instruments of ratification
of each treaty, Panama will reaffirm its right to self-determination, respect for
its territorial integrity and political independence and its rejection of all forms
of intervention in its internal affairs and will ask the United States to reaffirm
its commitments in accordance with the UN and OAS Charters.
Panama, 25 April 1978, Foreign Ministry.
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